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ALTERNATIVE RESTRICTIONS OF SEX 
OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA USE & THE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Norah M. Sloss* 
“The creation of the modern image of sexual offending owes much to the emergence 
of a mass media that can tell its readers and viewers how to respond and make sense 
of the deviant among us.”1 
  —Terry Thomas 
 
As technology advances, new mediums for communication of information 
and networking continue to rapidly evolve. The evolution of social media and 
social networking sites has increased society’s reliance on the Internet by ena-
bling people to communicate and network with each other instantaneously.2 
Modern technology and heightened dependence on the Internet in our society 
have created legal issues that courts have only begun to attempt to resolve 
throughout recent decades.3 However, as these issues become more complex 
and more widespread, the law has failed to create viable solutions to combating 
Internet crimes.4 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate 2016, The Catholic University of America: Columbus School of Law; B.A. 
2013, Loyola University New Orleans. The author would like to thank Professor Mary 
Leary for her expert guidance on the subject matter of this Note and the editorial board of 
the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology for their assistance throughout the 
writing and editing process. The author would also like to thank her family, most important-
ly, her parents, Barbara and Michael Sloss; her sisters, Hannah, Molly, and Michelle Sloss; 
and her friends for their enduring love, encouragement, and support throughout law school. 
 1 TERRY THOMAS, THE REGISTRATION AND MONITORING OF SEX OFFENDERS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 25 (2011) (noting that Terry Thomas is an Emeritus Professor of Criminal 
Justice Studies at Leeds Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom and he has focused 
his research on matters relating to sex offender registration and monitoring). 
 2 Jasmine Fowlkes, Viewpoint: Why Social Media Is Destroying Our Social Skills, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2012/10/11/opinion-
why-social-media-is-destroying-our-social-skills/. 
 3 STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS AND BEHAVIOR 
128 (2d ed. 2002). 
 4 Ulf Wolf, Cyber-Crime: Law Enforcement Must Keep Pace With Tech-Savvy Crimi-
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Social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn 
have made communications between strangers instantaneous and recurrent.5 
Internet crimes, such as cyber-stalking, cyber-bullying, harassment, and solici-
tation, may be committed more easily through social media and social net-
working sites due to their anonymous nature.6 In particular, the use of social 
media and social networking sites make the commission of sex offenses, such 
as solicitation of minors, possession and distribution of child pornography, 
sexual harassment and abuse, and stalking, more problematic for law enforce-
ment agencies to monitor and deter due to the high volume of internet commu-
nications occurring across national and international boundaries.7 
Despite a growing recognition of the problem, the number of online sexual 
offense cases has continued to rise.8 Perhaps more troubling is the fact that a 
majority of these cases involve child pornography. Indeed, the number of cases 
in which the Internet and communications technologies are used to sexually 
solicit minors is increasing as well.9 In an attempt to prevent sex crimes, vari-
ous states have enacted legislation to ban sex offenders from using social net-
working sites.10 Three such laws were challenged in federal court in Nebras-
ka11, Indiana12, and Louisiana,13 and ultimately were found to violate the First 
Amendment. 
This Note will examine how restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use 
may violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Part I will discuss 
the evolution of restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use. Part II will 
evaluate the competing First Amendment issues of sex offenders’ rights to free 
                                                                                                                 
nals, GOVTECH.COM (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/Cyber-Crime-
Law-Enforcement-Must-Keep-Pace.html. 
 5 Susan Tardarnico, Is Social Media Sabotaging Real Communication?, FORBES: 
LEADERSHIP (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:52 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susantardanico/2012/04/30/is-social-media-sabotaging-real-
communication. 
 6 Kimberly Mitchell et al., Use of Social Networking Sites in Online Sex Crimes 
Against Minors: An Examination of National Incidence and Means of Utilization, 47 J. AD-
OLESC. HEALTH 183, 186 (2010). 
 7 Id. 
 8 MICHAEL C. SETO, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS AND THE RISK TO RE-OFFEND 1 (2012), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-
meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_15_Seto.pdf. 
 9 Id. 
 10 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, RESTRICTION OR BAN OF SOCIAL NETWORKING USE FOR 
SEX OFFENDERS COMPILATION 4-13 (2013) [hereinafter NDAA, RESTRICTION], 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/sex%20Offenders%20and%20Social%20. 
 11 Doe v. Nebraska (Doe I), 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012). 
 12 Doe v. Prosecutor (Doe II), 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 13 Doe v. Jindal (Doe III), 853 F.Supp.2d 596 (M.D.La. 2012). 
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speech. Part II will also discuss how protecting children on social networking 
sites is a compelling state interest. Part III will examine how federal and state 
courts and legislatures have approached full and partial bans on sex offenders’ 
social media use in the past. Part IV will discuss recent legislation that aims to 
provide a solution to the First Amendment issues raised in the past by impos-
ing notice requirements on sex offenders’ social networking profiles and crime 
specific restrictions on social media use. Part IV will argue that a blanket ban 
on sex offenders’ social media use is unconstitutional; however, partial re-
strictions on social media use, such as those used in Louisiana, based on the 
individual nature of one’s committed sex offense are appropriate and easier to 
enforce. Additionally, imposing notice requirements on sex offenders’ social 
media profiles is the functional equivalent of registering on a sex offender reg-
istry, which is already required by law and made available online, and is thus 
not more restrictive than existing restrictions for many registered sex offend-
ers. Part IV will argue that Louisiana’s revised statute, which defines the un-
lawful use of a social networking website, should serve as a model law for oth-
er states to adopt. Part V will conclude that legislation that restricts sex offend-
ers’ social media use through the use of crime specific restrictions and notice 
requirements on social networking sites are less restrictive than banning sex 
offenders’ social media use. Such legislation should therefore be upheld by the 
states to best monitor sex offenders’ activity and protect children on social 
networking sites. Through analyzing the history and evolution of restrictions 
on sex offenders’ social media use, this Note will demonstrate why Louisiana’s 
revised statute should serve as a model for other states to adopt as the best al-
ternative to bans on sex offenders’ social media use. 
I. HISTORY OF RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA 
USE 
The common restrictions placed on registered sex offenders have evolved to 
reflect the changing nature of methods of predation by sex offenders.14 Sexual 
offenses are particularly harmful and are serious crimes.15 Sexual offenses are 
often violent and intrusive experiences that invade the psychological and bodi-
                                                 
 14 Denise-Marie Ordway, Sex offender laws, registries and policy questions: Research 
roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Jul. 17, 2015), 
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/criminal-justice/sex-offender-laws-
registries-and-gender-research-roundup. 
 15 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES, at i (1996), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sex-
offense-topics/199606-rtc-sex-crimes-against-children/199606_RtC_SCAC.pdf. 
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ly integrity of the person assaulted.16 These experiences are more harmful 
when the victim of a sexual assault is a child who does not understand the sig-
nificance of what is happening to them.17 
There are a variety of crimes that would cause a perpetrator to have to regis-
ter as a sex offender, many of which involve crimes against children. Sex 
crimes are often divided into those considered “non-contact” crimes and those 
that involve contact.18  Non-contact crimes include those offenders who pos-
sess or distribute child pornography, but have no actual contact with children.19 
Contact crimes are those involving actual contact with children such as solici-
tation, incest, and sexual assault.20 Sex offender registration is based on laws 
that require people convicted of certain sex offenses to keep in contact with 
law enforcement authorities in order to notify them of any changes in their cir-
cumstances.21 Registries were created due to the belief that many sex offenders 
are likely to re-offend.22 Through the use of sex offender registries, law en-
forcement agencies have access to improved data and are thus better equipped 
to protect the public from future offenses in any given geographical area.23 
Through the act of registering, sex offenders are deterred and prevented from 
re-offending as well.24 The public can also access sex offender registries to 
receive basic information about sex offenders living in their communities, 
which enables individuals and families to take steps to protect themselves and 
their children.25 
There are now over 500,000 registered sex offenders in the United States.26 
According to the U.S. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 
“sex offenders pose an enormous challenge for policy makers: they evoke un-
paralleled fears among constituents; their offenses are associated with a great 
risk of psychological harm; and most of their victims are children and youth.”27 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, which requires the states to im-
                                                 
 16 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 2. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 3. 
 19 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 15. 
 20 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 3. 
 21 Id. at 1. 
 22 Id. at 48-49. 
 23 Id. at 1. 
 24 Id. at 3. 
 25 HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 112. 
 26 Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Department of Justice Activates National Sex Offend-
er Public Registry Website (July 20, 2005) (available at 
http://www.amberalert.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/ojp_05_0720.htm). 
 27 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 2-3. 
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plement their own sex offender registries.28 The Act requires all states to have a 
registry in place that records the names of those convicted of offenses against 
children or a sexually violent offense.29 If a state fails to comply, it loses 10 
percent of its federal funding for crime control payable through local law en-
forcement assistance grants.30 
In 2006, Congress enacted the Federal Sex Offenders National Registration 
Act (SORNA),31 which mandates that sex offenders disclose the following in-
formation when they register with their state registry: address, employment 
information, social security number, and other personal information for moni-
toring purposes.32 SORNA was enacted with the aim of improving the quality 
of state registries, creating more consistency among them,33 and establishing a 
floor for mandatory disclosures. The states may impose their own restrictions 
on registered sex offenders in addition to federal requirements, but they must 
meet the minimum requirements of SORNA.34 Many states impose residency 
restrictions on registered sex offenders that regulate how close a registered sex 
offender may live or work in relation to schools or daycare centers.35 Many 
states also impose restrictions on contact with minors,36 obtaining commercial 
licenses,37 alcohol and drug use,38 and use of computers and the Internet.39 
In 2008, Congress enacted The Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Pred-
ators Act (the KIDS Act), which requires registered sex offenders to provide 
their Internet identifiers to the authorities and notify them of any changes.40 In 
Alaska v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that “an imposition of restrictive 
                                                 
 28 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registra-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (repealed 2009); see 
also THOMAS, supra note 1 at 45 (noting that the Act was passed as part of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act, as a clear effort to enforce preventative measures). 
 29 § 170101(a)(1), 108 Stat. at 2038; THOMAS, supra note 1 at 46. 
 30 § 170101(f)(2)(A), 108 Stat. at 2042; THOMAS, supra note 1 at 45-46. 
 31 Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 
101-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et. seq. (2012)). 
 32 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICA-
TION 26-33 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ, GUIDELINES], 
http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf. 
 33 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 50. 
 34 DOJ, GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 6. 
 35 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Get Answers About Sexual Abuse and Associated Risks, NAT’L 
SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, http://www.nsopw.gov/en-
US/Education/CommonQuestions#answer-12, (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
 36 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(e) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.102(4)(b)(B) 
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.17 (2015). 
 37 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ l4-208.l9A, 20-27.1, 20-37.14A. 
 38 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-5.2(C)(5) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:561.5(5) 
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b2)(9). 
 39 United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:561.5(16); GA. CODE ANN. §42-8-35(b)(3) (2015). 
 40 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 55. 
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measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is ‘a legitimate non-
punitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.’”41 
Thus, many state restrictions on sex offenders’ activities have been upheld in 
order to protect public safety, which is the key issue in evaluating the restric-
tive nature of bans on sex offenders’ social media use.42 Therefore, it is neces-
sary to examine the importance of social media to society by evaluating the 
advantages and disadvantages of social media use. 
A. Importance of Social Media Access 
 
Access to social media is extremely important to society. Social media use 
amongst young people is so widespread and frequent that it may even be con-
sidered essential for communication with others.43 Facebook, the most popular 
social networking website,44 has 1.23 billion monthly active users, 945 million 
mobile users, and 757 million daily users.45 The primary use of social network-
ing sites, such as Facebook, is to facilitate communication between people.46 
Through the use of instant and direct messaging on social networking sites,47 
constant interaction with others has become commonplace.48 
B. The Advantages of Social Media 
However, there are many other useful aspects of social networking sites. 
MySpace has become a common platform for musicians and bands to promote 
                                                 
 41 Alaska v. Doe (Doe IV), 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003). 
 42 See id. at 85 (explaining that the Alaska Legislature’s intent was to protect the public 
specifically from sex offenders); United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 43 AMANDA LENHART, PEW RES. CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA, & TECHNOLOGY OVER-
VIEW 2015, at 2 (2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/04/PI_TeensandTech_Update2015_0409151.pdf 
(finding that 92 percent of teens use the internet daily). 
 44 Online Exposure: Social Networks, Mobile Phones, and Scams Can Threaten Your 
Security, 76 CONSUMER REPTS., June 2011, at 29-33 [hereinafter Online Exposure], 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/june/electronics-
computers/state-of-the-net/facebook-concerns/index.htm. 
 45 Emil Protalinski, Facebook passes 1.23 billion monthly active users, 945 million 
mobile users, and 757 million daily users, THE NEXT WEB (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:12 PM), 
http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/01/29/facebook-passes-1-23-billion-monthly-active-
users-945-million-mobile-users-757-million-daily-users. 
 46 About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last 
visited (Sept. 17, 2015). 
 47 MAEVE DUGGAN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2014, at 10 (2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf. 
 48 Id. 
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and share their music.49 Twitter, the most popular “micro blogging” site, has 
become extremely popular for public relations and advertising for both indi-
viduals and businesses.50 Meanwhile, LinkedIn has become the primary meth-
od of professional networking online.51 Social media has become a major plat-
form for news collection and distribution as well.52 During the 2012 presiden-
tial election, both President Obama and Mitt Romney used Facebook and Twit-
ter as campaign tools.53 Today, President Obama has 56.4 million twitter fol-
lowers and has tweeted over 13,000 tweets.54 Accordingly, social networking 
sites have become a powerful tool for facilitating communication socially, po-
litically, and personally. Restrictions on social media use thus place a limit on 
the type and method of communication available to the public. The prevalence 
of social media and the various useful aspects of social networking sites show 
how restrictions on social media use can be prohibitive and restrict one’s abil-
ity to communicate and interact with others in a normal fashion. 
C. The Dangers of Social Media 
The legitimate uses of social media and social networking sites, such as 
communicating with friends and family, professional networking, and access-
ing news, provide valuable benefits to those who use them. However, the pub-
lic nature of social media and social networking sites does implicate public 
safety risks, especially for minors.55 The Children’s Online Privacy and Protec-
tion Act (COPPA)56, mandates that Facebook requires users to be over 13 years 
                                                 
 49 Heather McDonald, Promote Music on Myspace, ABOUT CAREERS, 
http://musicians.about.com/od/musicpromotion/ht/myspacemusicpr.htm (last visited Sept. 
26, 2015). 
 50 Paul Gil, What Exactly Is “Twitter?” What is “Tweeting?”, ABOUT TECH., 
http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/internet101/f/What-Exactly-Is-Twitter.htm (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2015). 
 51 Dave Roos, How LinkedIn Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/networks/linkedin.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 52 Johnathan Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook: The Freedom of Speech 
Implications of Banning Sex Offenders From Social Media, 89 IND. L.J. 1327, 1331-32 
(2014). 
 53 LEE RAINIE & AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., POLITICS ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
MAIN FINDINGS 5 (2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_PoliticalLifeonSocialNetworkingSites.pdf. 
 54 Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/barackobama, (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 55 CLAIRE LILLEY & RUTH BALL, NAT’L SOC. FOR THE PREV. OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, 
YOUNGER CHILDREN AND SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: A BLIND SPOT 22 (2013), 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/research-reports/younger-children-social-
networking-sites-report.pdf. 
 56 Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 
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of age; yet in 2011, more than one third of Facebook users were younger than 
13.57 One million children were harassed, threatened, or subjected to other 
forms of cyber-bullying on Facebook in 2011 as well.58 A study conducted in 
2006 by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children found that 
approximately 13 percent of youth Internet users received unwanted sexual 
solicitations online.59 
A similar survey of juvenile victims of Internet-initiated sex crimes found 
that the majority of the victims met the predator willingly face-to-face and that 
93 percent of those interactions involved sexual contact.60 In 2010, a study in 
the Journal of Adolescent Health reported that in 82 percent of online sex 
crimes against minors, the offender used the victim’s social networking site to 
gain information about the victim’s likes and dislikes.61 The study also found 
that in 62 percent of online sex crimes against minors, the offender used the 
victim’s social networking site to gain home and school information about the 
victim.62 Social networking sites provide child sex offenders with a wide array 
of people who share their sexual attraction to children as well.63 Many child 
sex offenders use social networking sites to share and trade child pornography, 
chat with children, and establish personal connections with children in an at-
tempt to locate children to abuse.64 These findings demonstrate how sex of-
fenders often use social networking sites to engage in sexual offenses, which 
creates a serious risk for minors. 
D. Bans on Sex Offenders’ Social Media Use 
Due to the fact that online sex crimes against minors increasingly involve 
the use of social media, numerous states have recently enacted restrictions on 
sex offenders’ social media use in order to prevent further sexual abuse of mi-
nors through the use of social media.65  Laws that attempted to entirely ban sex 
                                                                                                                 
(2012). 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1); Online Exposure, supra note 44, at 29-33. 
 58 Online Exposure, supra note 44, at 29-33. 
 59 JANIS WOLAK, DAVID FINKELHOR, & KIMBERLY MITCHELL, NAT’L CTR FOR MISSING & 
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 7 (2006), 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC167.pdf. 
 60 Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, & Kimberly Mitchell, Internet Initiated Sex Crimes 
Against Minors: Implications for Prevention Based on Findings From A National Study, 35 
J. ADOLESC. HEALTH 424.e11, 424.e17 (2004). 
 61 Mitchell et al., supra note 6 at 185. 
 62 Id. 
 63 HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 129. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See generally NDAA, RESTRICTION, supra note 10, at 4-13 (stating that Florida, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, South 
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offenders’ social media use in Indiana66, Nebraska67, and Louisiana68 were chal-
lenged in federal court and struck down. 
The Indiana statute, passed in 2012, applied to sex offenders who were re-
quired to register for committing several enumerated offenses, many of which 
involved crimes against children.69 The statute banned registered sex offenders 
from using all social networking websites, instant messaging programs, and 
chat rooms.70 The Louisiana statute, passed in 2011, applied to registered sex 
offenders whom were convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornog-
raphy involving juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video 
voyeurism.71 The statute banned registered sex offenders from using and ac-
cessing all social networking sites, chat rooms and peer-to-peer networks.72 
The Nebraska statute, passed in 2010, applied to registered sex offenders who 
committed one or more sex offenses involving a minor.73 The statue banned 
registered sex offenders from knowingly and intentionally using a social net-
working site, as well as any instant messaging or chat room service that allows 
a person who is less than 18 years of age to access or use it.74 
All three of these statutes applied to similar offenders—those who commit-
ted sex offenses involving minors.75 Additionally, each statute also banned reg-
istered sex offenders from using all social networking sites.76 Each statute was 
enacted with the purpose of protecting children from sexual predators online.77 
Yet, all three statutes were found unconstitutional in federal court due to First 
                                                                                                                 
Carolina, and Texas have adopted laws to prevent sex offenders from using social media). 
 66 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 694-695. 
 67 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87. 
 68 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 596. 
 69 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696. 
 70 Id. at 695-696. 
 71 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 599-600. 
 72 Id. at 599. 
 73 NEB. REV. ST. § 28-322.05(1)(a-k) (2010). The following offenses require registra-
tion: 
(a) Kidnapping of a minor; (b) Sexual assault of a child in the first degree; (c) 
Sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree; (d) Incest of a minor; (e) 
Pandering of a minor; (f) Visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct of a child; 
(g) Possessing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct; (h) Criminal 
child enticement; (i) Child enticement by means of an electronic communication 
device; (j) Enticement by electronic communication; or (k) An attempt or conspir-
acy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses. 
Id. 
 74 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1094. 
 75 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1094; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 
599. 
 76 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 695; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1093-94; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 
599. 
 77 Hitz, supra note 52, at 1327. 
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Amendment violations.78 Taken together, each case challenging these statutes 
provides a solid framework for a constitutional analysis of the restrictions on 
sex offenders’ social media use. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Several First Amendment issues arose in Doe v. Prosecutor79, Doe v. Ne-
braska80, and Doe v. Jindal81 (collectively the “Doe cases”) that ultimately led 
federal courts to find total bans on sex offenders’ social media use unconstitu-
tional. This section will discuss the constitutional rights of convicted sex of-
fenders and then examine how each case presented free speech issues. The dis-
cussion will then shift to how each court balanced free speech interests with 
the compelling state interest of protecting children from sexual abuse online 
and ultimately concluded that total bans on sex offenders’ social media use are 
unconstitutional. 
A. First Amendment Freedom of Speech 
The Supreme Court has evaluated First Amendment challenges involving 
free speech issues through various levels of scrutiny based on the nature of the 
speech regulated. Such statutes regulating speech are thus deemed either a 
“content based” or “content neutral” restriction on speech.82 A statute is con-
tent-based if it regulates speech based on the content of the speech expressed.83 
In contrast, a statute is content-neutral if it regulates speech without reference 
to the content of the speech.84 For example, a law that regulates the sound am-
plification of a rock concert held within a public park is content-neutral be-
cause it does not regulate the content of the conveyed speech, it simply regu-
lates the noise level of the expressed speech to protect the public interest.85 A 
law that prohibits offensive speech, such as wearing an item of clothing with 
profanity on it, is not content neutral because it restricts speech based on the 
words contained and the message conveyed, and therefore, would be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.86 
                                                 
 78 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 703; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1131; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 
607. 
 79 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 697-98. 
 80 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1107-08. 
 81 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 603-04. 
 82 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989). 
 83 Id. at 793-94. 
 84 Id. at 792. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971). 
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The Court will apply a strict scrutiny analysis if a statute is content based. 
Strict scrutiny requires the statute serve a compelling government interest, it is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest and it is the least restrictive means for 
achieving that interest.87 If the statute is content neutral, the Court will apply an 
intermediate scrutiny analysis, which means the statute must serve a significant 
governmental interest, must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and 
must leave open ample alternative channels for communicating the infor-
mation.88 The court applies intermediate scrutiny when evaluating the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on sex offenders’ First Amendment rights. 
B. Limits on First Amendment Rights 
1. Pell v. Procunier: 
The Supreme Court has not specifically defined the First Amendment rights 
of convicted sex offenders or other convicted felons. However, the Supreme 
Court has specifically addressed the First Amendment rights of prisoners.89 In 
Pell v. Procunier, the Court notes that “a prison inmate retains those First 
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with 
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”90 Thus, pris-
oners are not denied their constitutional rights while imprisoned. However, 
they may be denied certain liberties if the exercise thereof interferes with the 
safety of the prison environment.91 The Pell Court held that prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights were not violated when they were not permitted to initiate 
interviews with journalists.92 The Court held that due to safety concerns involv-
ing face-to-face interviews and discipline issues within prisons, the restriction 
on prisoners’ communications with journalists did not violate their First 
Amendment rights.93 The Court found that since such restrictions are normal 
within a prison environment and the inmates are left with alternative channels 
of communication, their freedom of speech is adequately protected.94 
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2. Beard v. Banks: 
In Beard v. Banks, the Court reiterated the notion that, “imprisonment does 
not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protec-
tions, including those of the First Amendment. But, at the same time the Con-
stitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it 
would allow elsewhere.”95 Yet the Beard Court also held that certain prisoners, 
who committed violent crimes and were held in the more secure level of the 
prison,96 were not deprived of their First Amendment rights when they were 
denied access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs.97 The 
Court found the need to strictly monitor these prisoners and hold them in more 
strict confinement due to their violent behavior in prison, which outweighed 
First Amendment concerns.98 The Court emphasized the other First Amend-
ment rights available to the prisoners99 and the reasonableness of the restriction 
to maintain safety and promote better behavior among inmates.100 
C. Limits on First Amendment Rights for Registered Sex Offenders 
The lower federal courts address the First Amendment rights of sex offend-
ers’ in the Doe line of cases by analyzing the alternative channels of communi-
cation available to registered sex offenders if deprived of social media use and 
by balancing their First Amendment rights with the compelling interest of pro-
tection children’s safety.101 While the analysis of First Amendment rights of 
prisoners informs the analysis of registered sex offenders’ First Amendment 
rights, there is a crucial difference in the release status of prisoners and regis-
tered sex offenders.102 Many registered sex offenders have already completed 
their sentences and are released on probation, parole, or other forms of super-
vised release.103 All registered sex offenders are already monitored by law en-
forcement through the act of registering as well.104 Offenders receive greater 
constitutional protection as the punishment for their crime moves along the 
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continuum from more liberty-intrusive to less liberty-intrusive.105 Therefore, it 
follows that the protection of registered sex offenders’ First Amendment rights 
should be greater than that of prisoners. Many sex offenders have already 
served prison sentences.106 Thus, the act of registering as a sex offender serves 
less of a punitive purpose and is less liberty-intrusive. It is up to the courts to 
determine to what extent those rights can be restricted in the interest of public 
safety. 
D. First Amendment Right to Free Speech Analysis in Doe cases 
As mentioned earlier, restrictions on free speech must be content neutral, 
which means that restrictions must not discriminate on speech based on its 
content.107 Each Doe Court agreed that each statute banning sex offenders’ so-
cial media use was a content neutral restriction because it restricted speech 
without reference to the expression’s conduct.108 Content neutral restrictions 
must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld as constitutional.109 In other 
words, states may regulate content neutral speech if the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve a governmental interest and if the regulation leaves open am-
ple alternative channels for communication of information.110 A regulation will 
be found to be narrowly tailored if it does not substantially burden more speech 
than necessary to serve its intended interest.111 The Supreme Court has held, 
“[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the 
exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy. A complete ban can be narrowly 
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appro-
priately targeted evil.”112 In deciding whether bans on registered sex offenders’ 
social media use was a First Amendment violation, the Doe113 Courts had to 
first recognize social media use as protected speech under the First Amend-
ment then analyze how restrictive banning such speech would be for registered 
sex offenders. 
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1. Doe v. Prosecutor 
In Doe v. Prosecutor, the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana statute clearly 
violated the First Amendment right to free speech because it precludes expres-
sion through the medium of social media114 and limits the right to receive in-
formation and ideas.115 The Seventh Circuit noted that illicit communication is 
only a subset of social network activity116 and found that the Indiana statue was 
not narrowly tailored because it was overly inclusive.117 The statute was found 
to be over inclusive because it banned sex offenders from all uses of social 
media, rather than just solicitation of minors, and therefore targeted substan-
tially more activity than the evil it sought to redress.118 
The Court also found the statute was not narrowly tailored because Indiana 
had other ways of combating unwanted communication between minors and 
sex offenders since solicitation of a minor is already a crime in Indiana that 
serves the same purpose of protecting children.119 The Seventh Circuit states, 
“[a]n adequate alternative does not have to be the speaker’s first or best choice 
. . . or one that provides the same audience or impact for the speech.”120 The 
Seventh Circuit found that although the Indiana statute was not narrowly tai-
lored, it did leave open ample alternative channels of communication because 
those affected by the statute still had various “old fashioned” methods of 
communication available to them.121 The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that 
the statute was not likely to stop sex offenders from engaging in illegal activity 
and that such a ban chills too much expressive conduct. 122 
2. Doe v. Jindal 
The court in Doe v. Jindal found the statute addressed protected speech un-
der the First Amendment and aimed to promote a legitimate and compelling 
state interest of protecting children.123 However, the ban on social media use 
unreasonably restricted uses of the Internet completely unrelated to the activi-
ties sought to be banned by the statute.124 The statute not only banned the use 
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of social networking sites, but also banned registered sex offenders from ac-
cessing social networking sites.125 Thus, the court found the statute was uncon-
stitutional because it was overbroad and not narrowly tailored to serve its’ goal 
of protecting children from online predators.126 Additionally, the court con-
strued the statute to impose a sweeping ban on many commonly used websites, 
such as news sites and blogs.127 Therefore, the statute failed to leave open am-
ple alternative channels for communication of information by banning access 
to too many websites. The court found that this was problematic because it did 
not address the goal of the statute and involved a greater intrusion on registered 
sex offenders’ First Amendment rights than was reasonably necessary.128 The 
court also found it confusing for those seeking to comply with the statute since 
it was unclear which specific websites they would be prohibited from access-
ing.129 
3. Doe v. Nebraska 
The court in Doe v. Nebraska noted the Supreme Court has made clear that 
First Amendment protections for speech extend fully to Internet communica-
tions as well as anonymous speech.130 However, the court pointed to a flaw that 
all three statutes had in common,131 which was the bans did not “require a 
showing that the offender poses a present threat to use . . . [social media] to get 
at children,”132 and therefore it was not narrowly tailored to target those of-
fenders who pose a risk to children through the use, or threatened use, of 
banned social media.133  The court also pointed to how restricting social media 
use affects one’s ability to read the news, video conference with family mem-
bers, participate in political discussions, and network with professionals and 
business associates.134 Thus, the court concluded that in addition to failing the 
narrowly tailored requirement, the Nebraska statute failed to leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication.135 
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4. Doe Courts Holding 
Ultimately, the Doe courts held that banning sex offenders’ social media use 
violates the First Amendment right to free speech and is therefore unconstitu-
tional.136 Such bans substantially burden more speech than is necessary to pro-
tect children from sex offenders and are therefore not narrowly tailored.137 
They also fail to leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
information due to society’s dependence on social media for many legitimate 
activities unrelated to the goals of these statutes.138 Therefore, in order to best 
protect children from sexual predation online, the states have to develop viable 
alternatives to banning sex offenders’ social media use. 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TOTAL BANS OF SEX 
OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
The burden on free speech presents challenges to state legislatures to create 
constitutionally permissible statutes that serve the purpose of protecting chil-
dren from sex offenders while monitoring sex offenders’ social media use. 
This Part will evaluate existing federal laws and various state statutes that aim 
to protect children from sexual predators online through alternative approaches 
to banning sex offenders’ social media use. 
A. Federal Legislation: SORNA Amendment 42 U.S.C. §16915b (2012) 
In 2008, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. §16915b, which amended SORNA.139 
This statute allows the U.S. Attorney General to create an identification system 
that allows social networking websites to check online identifiers that an Inter-
net user establishes in online communities and websites with those online iden-
tifiers registered with the National Sex Offender Registry.140 Upon receiving an 
Internet identifier that matches a name on the National Sex Offender Registry, 
the social networking site may ask the Attorney General to disclose certain 
information related to the individual.141 This information is limited to the indi-
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vidual’s name, sex, resident address, photograph, and physical description.142 
Many social networking sites, such as Facebook, prohibit sex offenders from 
using their websites.143 However, these rules are incredibly difficult to enforce. 
Many registered sex offenders who are on social media websites use Internet 
identifiers that are different from their own names.144 Therefore, using the veri-
fication system to compare information held on the National Sex Offender 
Registry with these Internet identifiers is not helpful.145 The federal checking 
system allows social networking sites to obtain information from the Depart-
ment of Justice only if they are focused on social interaction and their users 
include a significant number of minors.146 The statute clarifies the definition of 
social networking site to mean:  
[a]n internet website that allows users through the creation of web pages or profiles or 
by other means, to provide information about themselves that is available to the public 
or to other users; and that offers a mechanism for communication with other users 
where such users are likely to include a substantial number of minors; and whose pri-
mary purpose is to facilitate online social interactions.147 
This definition of social networking sites demonstrates that by allowing so-
cial networking sites to access and compare Internet identifiers with those of 
the national registry, the federal checking system’s purpose is to protect chil-
dren from solicitation by sex offenders on social networking sites.148 
The federal checking system both provides the government and social net-
working sites with tools to monitor registered sex offenders’ social media ac-
tivity, while it also limits monitoring so as to not infringe on sex offenders’ 
right to free speech.149  However, the checking system holds social networking 
sites and the government responsible for identifying those sex offenders who 
are prohibited from using social networking sites rather than holding the of-
fenders accountable for their own actions by forcing them to abide by legal 
restrictions on their social media use.150 Although the checking system estab-
lished by 42 U.S.C. §16195b is a viable alternative to banning sex offenders’ 
who use social media, it does not proactively deter registered sex offenders’ 
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from using social media to harm children. 
B. State Legislative Alternatives to Banning Social Media Use 
Many state courts have recently struck down bans on sex offenders’ social 
media on First Amendment grounds.151 Statutes banning sex offenders’ social 
media use in California, North Carolina, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and 
many others have been challenged in state courts.152 However, many other 
states have amended their statutes to provide alternative restrictions to bans on 
sex offenders’ social media use.153 Many states have amended their statutes to 
include restrictions on social media use as conditions of probation or parole 
rather than prohibiting it overall.154 For example, Minnesota,155 South Caroli-
na,156 and Texas157 statutes require that when a registered sex offender is re-
leased on probation or parole, the offender must be prohibited from using so-
cial media as a condition of his or her release. The Minnesota and Texas stat-
utes further provide that upon the probation or parole officer’s discretion, this 
condition may be modified if doing so does not jeopardize public safety158 or 
constitute an undue hardship on the individual offender.159 
The use of restrictions on sex offenders’ social media as a condition of pro-
bation or parole is a viable alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media 
use. The Constitutional rights of probationers, parolees, and those on super-
vised release have not been fully defined by or addressed by the courts.160 
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that probationers and parolees 
“do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”161 Judges 
and parole boards retain broad discretion in ordering conditions of probation 
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and parole, which are limited by sentencing guidelines.162 
Courts have upheld conditions of release that have implicated fundamental 
rights. In United States v. Sines, the Seventh Circuit found that “[a] court may 
impose conditions of supervised release which implicate fundamental rights so 
long as those conditions are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation 
and protection of the public from recidivism.”163 Therefore, the courts have 
broad discretion in imposing conditions of release on offenders as long as the 
conditions could reasonably provide some sort of rehabilitation for the offend-
er or prevent them from re-offending. 
1. Recidivism of Sex Offenders 
In order to create statutes and conditions of release that best protect children 
by preventing sex offenders from re-offending, it is crucial to discuss the risk 
of recidivism by sex offenders. Recidivism, the commission of a subsequent 
offense, is often measured by subsequent arrest, subsequent conviction, or sub-
sequent incarceration.164 Policy specialists and social scientists have found that 
sex offenders are more likely to reoffend than any other class of criminals.165 
Sex offenders are at a higher risk of reoffending when they become sexually 
preoccupied, have access to victims, and fail to acknowledge their recidivism 
risk.166 Risk assessments of sex offenders often group sex offenders into high 
risk, medium risk, and low risk offenders based on the seriousness of the of-
fense and the level of culpability by the offender.167 
A study by Dr. Michael C. Seto found that many registered sex offenders 
who commit online offenses, mostly involving child pornography, have either 
an official record of prior sexual offenses or admitted to committing a prior 
contact sexual offense.168 Thus, it is likely that sex offenders who have com-
mitted contact sexual offenses, such as rape or sexual assault, will engage in 
online sexual offending as well.169 Dr. Seto explains that online child pornog-
raphy offenders have a strong motivation to sexually offend against children 
due to their sexual interest in children, but have more inhibitions about acting 
on their motivations, and are therefore at a very high risk of re-offending 
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through use of the Internet.170 The circumstances surrounding the risk of recid-
ivism for sex offenders, such as access to victims and the high risk of re-
offending for online sexual offenders, clearly supports the need for states to 
narrowly tailor their restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use. Restricting 
registered sex offenders’ social media use as a condition of probation, parole, 
or supervised release is reasonably related to rehabilitation and protection of 
the public from recidivism for those offenders who used the Internet or social 
media to commit a sex offense. 
Therefore, statutes should not include limitations on social media use as a 
condition of probation, parole, or supervised release, unless the sex offender 
used the Internet to perpetuate his or her crime, which the Minnesota171 and 
Texas172 statutes reflect. The New York statute173 also reflects this methodology 
and specifically addresses those offenders at risk of recidivism. The statute 
applies to registered sex offenders who committed an offense against a minor, 
are at greatest risk of re-offense, and used the Internet to facilitate commission 
of a crime. Furthermore, it requires that offenders be prohibited from using the 
Internet to access social networking sites as a mandatory condition of proba-
tion or conditional discharge.174 This alternative approach of restricting sex 
offenders’ social media use through conditions of probation, parole, and super-
vised release is more narrowly tailored to those offenders who committed sex 
offenses through the use of social networking sites, yet is more effective in 
protecting children for a period of time. 
2. Limitations of Conditional Approach 
The key issue with these statutes is that they only apply for a probationary 
period, parole, or supervised release.175 While this may be all that is necessary 
to combat recidivism in some cases, it is less comforting to the public.176 Fur-
thermore, it still holds probation and parole officers responsible for monitoring 
sex offenders’ social media use rather than the individual offender.177 This cre-
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ates difficulty in enforcement since probation and parole officers are not able 
to constantly monitor the physical actions of their offenders and would there-
fore undoubtedly struggle to monitor the social media activity of their offend-
ers as well. 
Although these statues are difficult to enforce, they provide an alternative to 
total bans on sex offenders’ social media use through a narrowly tailored ap-
proach that is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of sex offenders and the 
protection of children. Thus, other states can look to the Minnesota, Texas, and 
New York statutes as models for restricting sex offenders’ social media use, 
and amend their statutes to reflect a similar construction. However, these stat-
utes should be improved upon to provide more permanent solutions. For ex-
ample, if an offender violated a condition during probation, parole, or super-
vised release, or has demonstrated that he or she continues to pose a threat to 
children, the appropriate sentencing authority should be able to impose re-
strictions on those offenders’ social media use as a condition of registration 
following the end of their sentence, which would have a much more permanent 
effect. 
IV. SOLUTION OF MORE PERMANENT LEGISLATION 
As previously addressed, some states have implemented statutes that ban sex 
offenders’ social media use only for those offenders who have facilitated a sex 
offense through use of the Internet or a social networking site as conditions of 
probation, parole, and supervised release, which only protects the public from 
recidivism for short periods of time.178 This Part will address how states could 
enact legislation specifically catered to different offenses, which would protect 
children’s safety without infringing the free speech right of sex offenders to 
partial access of social media. This Part will argue that Louisiana’s revised 
statute defining unlawful use of a social networking site provides the best 
means to restrict sex offenders’ use of social media within the confines of the 
First Amendment. By doing so, the Louisiana statute serves as a model for oth-
er states to follow. 
A. Legislation that Expands Notice Requirements 
In addition to revising their existing statute, Louisiana enacted a new statute 
in 2012 requiring registered sex offenders to include an indication that they are 
a sex offender or child predator on their social network profiles.179 The statute 
also requires offenders to include notice of the crime for which they were con-
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victed, the jurisdiction of the conviction, a description of their physical charac-
teristics, and their residential address.180 Jeff Thompson, the Louisiana state 
representative who sponsored the bill, said the new statute provides the same 
notice to people “in whose home you are injecting yourself via the Internet.”181 
He explained he is not trying to create a ban on sex offenders’ social media 
use, but is simply trying to create an expansion of existing notice require-
ments.182 This alternative approach to bans on sex offenders’ social media use 
is effective in protecting the safety of children because it provides notice to the 
public of the presence of sex offenders whom are using social networking sites, 
and gives the public an opportunity to avoid communication with them, if they 
choose to do so. This approach also holds the individual offender accountable 
for abiding by the restrictions, much like any other registration requirements. 
1. Proposed Legislation: 2014 N.J. S.B. 140 
New Jersey has recently proposed a bill modeled after the new Louisiana 
statute.183 The proposed legislation in New Jersey requires disclosure of the 
fact that the individual is a sex offender and, “include[s] notice of the crime for 
which he was convicted, the jurisdiction of the conviction, a description of his 
physical characteristics, and his residential address.”184 The proposed New Jer-
sey legislation and the Louisiana statute are viable and effective alternatives to 
bans on sex offenders’ social media use. They function very similarly to exist-
ing notice requirements imposed by state and national sex offender regis-
tries. 185 
2. Compelled Speech 
The Louisiana and New Jersey approaches are enforceable as conditions of 
registration, and are thus permanently applicable. However, these laws may 
face First Amendment challenges under the compelled speech doctrine.186 The 
Supreme Court has held, “[j]ust as the First Amendment may prevent the gov-
ernment from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government 
from compelling individuals to express certain views.”187 By forcing registered 
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sex offenders to provide notice of their status as a sex offender and disclose the 
offense, jurisdiction of the offense, their physical characteristics, and their res-
idential address, the government is compelling speech, but not compelling in-
dividuals to express a certain viewpoint. The Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR held 
that compelled speech violations result from the fact that the “complaining 
speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommo-
date.”188 Consequently, the Louisiana and New Jersey statutes could be struck 
down if a court finds that an individual sex offender’s own message is affected 
by disclosing their status as a sex offender on their social media profiles. 
However, this is unlikely because the notice requirements of the Louisiana 
statute and the proposed bill in New Jersey do not express a message or view-
point; they simply reiterate what is already publicly available information on 
state and national sex offender registries online.189 The individual publication 
of this information on one’s own social networking profile does not change the 
analysis. These statutes are similar to those of many states that require regis-
tered sex offenders to post signs on their homes during Halloween.190 
For example, under Maryland law, the Maryland Division of Parole and 
Probation provides registered sex offenders with signs that read, “NO CAN-
DY,” and require them to post these signs in their windows during Hallow-
een.191 Since Halloween is a holiday that is almost exclusively celebrated by 
children and their families, state legislatures have found it necessary to limit 
sex offenders’ interactions with children by providing the public with extra 
notice of sex offenders in their community through the sign.192 The “NO 
CANDY” signs do not explicitly state the registration information of individu-
al sex offenders; however, Maryland is still expanding existing notice require-
ments for registered sex offenders by compelling them to post the signs in a 
very recognizable and public manner. 
Legislation that expands notice requirements of sex offender registration 
laws, like that of Louisiana and New Jersey, are not more problematic. The 
Louisiana statute and the proposed bill in New Jersey aim only to expand exist-
ing notice requirements of sex offender registries without expressing a mes-
sage or viewpoint. Therefore, both should be permitted alternatives to bans of 
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sex offenders’ social media use throughout the states. 
B. Legislation that Specifies by Offense 
The aforementioned statutes that provide for bans on sex offenders’ social 
media use during probation, parole, and supervised release specify that these 
restrictions only apply to those sex offenders who committed specific offenses 
against minors and those offenders who committed such an offense through the 
use of the Internet.193 These statutes would provide a more permanent alterna-
tive to bans on sex offenders’ social media use if they were conditions of regis-
tration rather than conditions of probation, parole, and supervised release. 
1. Louisiana’s Revised Statute: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2015). 
The statute that most closely exemplifies this solution is Louisiana’s revised 
statute.194 Since Doe v. Jindal, Louisiana revised its statute to specify that un-
lawful use of a social networking site applies to “the intentional use of a social 
networking website by person who is required to register as a sex offender and 
who was convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography involving 
juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video voyeurism.”195 The 
revised statute also applies to those offenders who were convicted of various 
aggravated offenses in which the victim was a minor.196 
a.  Enforceability 
Louisiana’s revised statute is more narrowly tailored and applies permanent-
ly to those registered sex offenders who are at risk of re-offending through the 
use of social media by only restricting the amount of speech that is necessary 
to protect the state’s intended interest, children’s safety. The statute states: 
(2)(a) “Social networking website” means an Internet website, the primary purpose of 
which is facilitating social interaction with other users of the website and has all of the 
following capabilities: (i) [a]llows users to create web pages or profiles about them-
selves that are available to the general public or to any other users. (ii) Offers a mech-
anism for communication among users. (b) “Social networking website” shall not in-
clude any of the following: (i) [a]n Internet website that provides only one of the fol-
lowing services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, or instant messaging. (ii) An Internet 
website the primary purpose of which is the facilitation of commercial transactions 
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involving goods or services between its members or visitors. (iii) An Internet website 
the primary purpose of which is the dissemination of news….197 
Louisiana’s Revised Statute is also more enforceable than the conditions of 
probation, parole, and supervised release because it holds the individual of-
fenders accountable for their own actions.198 By restricting social media use of 
those sex offenders’ who facilitated their offenses through the Internet or social 
media, like any other condition of initial registration as a sex offender, Louisi-
ana can ensure that those specific sex offenders may be rehabilitated and that 
the public will be protected from their possible recidivism. 
2. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication 
There may be some concerns that Louisiana’s revised statute does not leave 
open ample alternative means for communication for those sex offenders that it 
applies to. The courts would need to explicitly address and clarify this issue to 
determine whether or not social media is such an invaluable method of com-
munication that banning its use would not leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of information.199 However, as the court in Doe v. 
Prosecutor found, deprivation of social media use does leave open ample al-
ternative methods of old-fashioned communication.200 Furthermore, the re-
strictions on social media use in Louisiana’s revised statute do not apply to 
websites that provide only photo sharing, electronic mail, or instant messaging, 
primarily facilitate commercial transactions involving goods and services be-
tween its’ members or visitors, primarily disseminate news, and belong to a 
government entity.201 Therefore, under the revised statute, while registered sex 
offenders may be restricted from using Facebook202 or Twitter203, they would 
still be able to access Gmail204, Amazon205, Netflix206, CNN207, and many other 
websites that provide services unrelated to social networking with children. 
Louisiana’s revised statute only prohibits the use of social networking sites that 
are primarily used for facilitating social interaction.208 Therefore, it is not likely 
to be found too restrictive for failing to leave open ample alternative channels 
                                                 
 197 Id. § 14:91.5(B)(2)(a). 
 198 Id. § 14:91.5. 
 199 See Hitz, supra note 52, at 1356-58. 
 200 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696-99, 703. 
 201 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5B(2)(b). 
 202 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 203 TWITTER, https://www.twitter.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 204 GMAIL, https://www.mail.google.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 205 AMAZON, www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 206 NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 207 CNN, www.cnn.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 208 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5B(2)(a). 
136 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.1 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
of communication, which makes it more effective at targeting the activity the 
statute seeks to prohibit. 
C. Louisiana Revised Statute Provides Model Solution 
Although Louisiana and New Jersey’s notice oriented statutes do provide a 
viable alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media use, they are more 
difficult to enforce.209 The revised Louisiana statute that specifies unlawful use 
of a social networking website based on the crime committed by each individ-
ual sex offender is less restrictive and more enforceable than a total ban on 
every registered sex offenders’ social media use.210 This statute serves as a 
model for other states to look towards in constructing their own restrictions on 
registered sex offenders’ social media use because it specifies exactly which 
sex offenses the statute applies to, which types of social networking use is pro-
hibited, and what the consequences are for offenders whom do not comply 
with the statute.211 
The revised Louisiana statute restricts social media use of those offenders 
who have been convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography 
involving juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video voyeur-
ism.212 These specific sex offenses all involve harm to children. Thus, prevent-
ing offenders who have been convicted of these crimes protects both offenders 
and the public against recidivism and ultimately protects children from sexual 
predation.213 This statute also specifies which types of social networking sites 
sex offenders are prohibited from using.214 Furthermore, the statute specifies 
that “unlawful use” of a social networking website means to “create a profile 
on a social networking website or to contact or attempt to contact other users 
of the social networking website.”215 The statute makes very clear to whom the 
statute applies and what activity is restricted. Moreover, it also clearly defines 
the consequences for failing to comply with the statute:  
Whoever commits the crime of unlawful use of a social networking website 
shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and 
shall be imprisoned with hard labor for not more than ten years without benefit 
of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Whoever commits the crime of 
unlawful use of a social networking website, upon a second or subsequent con-
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viction, shall be fined not more than twenty thousand dollars and shall be im-
prisoned with hard labor for not less than five years nor more than twenty 
years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.216 
Thus, Louisiana’s revised statute provides notice of the consequences for 
failing to comply for registered sex offenders and ultimately protects the public 
from recidivism.217 This statute is also much less restrictive on the freedom of 
speech and a better alternative to banning social media use for all registered 
sex offenders.218 Furthermore, it is a more enforceable and permanent solution 
because the statute automatically applies to registered sex offenders upon con-
viction of one of the enumerated offenses rather than on an individual basis 
during probation or parole.219 The specifications of the statute also make it 
much more feasible for law enforcement to identify which offenders the statute 
applies to and what activity is prohibited.220 Thus, the revised Louisiana statute 
should serve as a model for other states to adopt in order to restrict registered 
sex offenders’ social media use in a manner that is less restrictive on free 
speech and best protects children from online sexual predation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As technology continuously advances, society’s dependence on the Internet 
and younger generations’ use of social media will continue to increase. Thus, 
the protection of children online has undeniably become a compelling state 
interest. States must incorporate and enforce laws that protect social interaction 
online to ensure the safety of children. However, these laws cannot deprive 
individuals of their constitutional liberties. Complete bans on registered sex 
offenders’ social media use deprive them of their right to free speech and are 
therefore unconstitutional. 
As an alternative to such bans, the states should implement more narrowly 
tailored restrictions of sex offenders’ social media use that specifically apply to 
those whom actually facilitated a sex offense through the use of the Internet or 
social media. The states can look to recent changes in sex offender registration 
laws throughout the country that emphasize the importance of offensive specif-
ic language, and the expansion of notice requirements to create effective and 
enforceable laws that provide rehabilitation for offenders and protection for the 
public. The states should specifically look to the revised Louisiana statute that 
defines unlawful use of a social networking website by registered sex offenders 
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as a model. The revised Louisiana statute provides a clearly enforceable and 
permanent alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media use and furthers 
the compelling interest of protecting children. 
